

European Union as a Mediator and Peace-builder in the Light of 2008 Russia-Georgia War

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Abstract

In 21st century the process of globalization has become more intense and irreversible; Hence, The international political system faces new challenges and directions. The European Union, which is one of the major actors in guarantying international balance in the world, wrapped up to reconsider its narratives affecting its actions and positions. This paper discusses applicable actions and tools employed by EU in developing these new narratives. The case of Russia-Georgia 2008 august war and EU’s involvement as a third party in this conflict is served as an example in this paper.

The first part of the research is focused on the historic background of Russian-Georgian relations regarding the South Ossetia breakaway region. main research questions are: What are the roots of this conflict and what was the reason of the conflict escalation spiral in 2008.

The second part is concentrated on EU’s role in conflict management and the mediation process, initiated and led by French EU presidency. The paper provides in-depth analysis of the motivation for EU involvement and results accomplished; which circumstances fostered conclusion of ceasefire agreement and what type of tools were applied by EU to obstruct Russian occupation.

The final part of the Paper draws conclusions on assumed effectiveness of the EU peace building plan envisaged in this Conflict. Moreover, linkage between the role of EU as a mediator and its new narrative views are also addressed in the conclusive remarks.

Keywords: EU, Russia, Georgia, Mediation, Conflict, Peace building, South Ossetia

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1. Introduction

Georgia, which has geo-politically strategic location in Caucasus region, over many centuries, was the attractive back-sight for powerful states, including Russian Empire. Russian-Georgian conflict has a long and bloody history but conflicts in Abkhazia, Georgia and Tskhinvali Region/South Ossetia, Georgia are deeply rooted in Soviet history, which all sides interpret in different ways, and the Union's nationality policies. Both conflicts erupted into large-scale violence as the USSR fell apart and competing claims – Tbilisi's for territorial integrity, versus the national independence claimed by the Ossetians and Abkhaz – could no longer be reconciled within the disintegrating empire.¹

These tensions were resulted in armed conflict and subsequently, lost of Georgian territories in both regions. Russia had been actively involved in these conflicts as a “natural” third party and supported separatist governments in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Following more than decade since the conflicts freeze and both Georgian territories remained breakaway, in 2008, new violent clashes occurred in Tskhinvali Region, which caused so-called Five Days war between Russia and Georgia.

2. Background

Ossetians are an ethnic Iranian group that became Christian in the early Middle Ages under Georgian and Byzantine influence. A consolidated Ossetian Kingdom was created in the eighth century A.D., but in the thirteenth century, having been driven out by invading Mongols, they arrived from the north to the area where they now reside, establishing large Ossetian communities in Georgia. After the Soviet troops occupied Georgia in 1921 and included it in the Soviet Union as a constituent republic, the South Ossetian Autonomous District was established in 1922 in the territory of the Central Province of Georgia. Some argue that this was granted by the Bolsheviks to the Ossetians in return for their assistance in fighting against a democratic Georgia and favoring local separatists, because this territory had never been a separate principality before.² A similar North Ossetian Autonomous District was created within the Russian Federation, dividing an established ethnic group by a state border. Regardless of active ethnic interaction during the Soviet period, many all-Georgian villages existed in South Ossetia, and the Ossetian population was mainly concentrated in the towns of Tskhinvali and Java. In the early 1990s, two-thirds of the region's population was Ossetian and one-third Georgian, while about 100,000 ethnic Ossetians continued to live in Georgia outside the South Ossetian region.³

In the 1990s, a secession movement supported by the Russian government was initiated in South Ossetia. The intent was to unite the province with Russian North Ossetia.⁴ Georgian actions aimed at returning the region to Tbilisi's control triggered a conflict in which 2,000 to 4,000 people were killed.⁵ Pursuant to a Russian-brokered ceasefire and agreements concluded in June 1992, Russian, Georgian, and Ossetian peacekeeping units totaling 1,100 men established their camp near Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia.⁶

¹ Magdalena Frichova Grono, “Georgia's Conflicts: What Role for the EU as Mediator?” Initiative for Peacebuilding, (International Alert, March 2010) 9;

² MIKHAIL KOSVEN, NARODY KAVKAZA [PEOPLE OF THE CAUCASUS] (Moscow: Nauka, 2002) 11;

³ Ekaterina Arkhipova, The Borders Between Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Russia: Soviet Heritage, CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS, 2005, No. 6, at 33;

⁴ Mark Saroyan, Beyond the Nation-State: Culture and Ethnic Politics in Soviet Transcaucasia, in NATIONALISM AND SOCIAL CHANGE (Ronald Suny ed., University of Michigan Press, 1996) 404;

⁵ Glenn E. Curtis ED., ARMENIA, AZERBAIJAN, AND GEORGIA: COUNTRY STUDIES (Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, 1995) 26;

⁶ “The Library of Congress” last modified March 14, 2014 <http://www.loc.gov/law/help/russian-georgia-war.php#f3>

3. Conflict escalation spiral

Simmering long-time tensions escalated on the evening of August 7, 2008, when South Ossetia and Georgia accused each other of launching intense artillery barrages against each other. Georgia claims that South Ossetian forces did not respond to a ceasefire appeal but intensified their shelling, “forcing” Georgia to send in troops. On August 8, Russia launched air attacks throughout Georgia and Russian troops engaged Georgian forces in South Ossetia. By the morning of August 10, Russian troops had occupied the bulk of South Ossetia, reached its border with the rest of Georgia, and were shelling areas across the border. Russian troops occupied several Georgian cities. Russian warships landed troops in Georgia’s breakaway Abkhazia region and took up positions off Georgia’s Black Sea coast.⁷

President Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia attempted to increase border control and limit smuggling operations in the region. He also sent police, military, and intelligence personnel into the region. In response, Russia sent several hundred paramilitary elements and reinforced South Ossetian authorities with Russian high-level law enforcement officials.⁸

Regardless of the different peace plans proposed by Georgian authorities, in November 2006, a popular referendum was held in South Ossetia to reaffirm its independence from Georgia. Ninety-nine percent of voters supported the referendum. In response, the Russian authorities actively started to grant Russian citizenship to South Ossetians and to issue them Russian passports.⁹

On July 3, 2008 tensions escalated in South Ossetia, when an Ossetian village police chief was killed by a bomb and the head of the pro-Georgian “government” in South Ossetia, Dmitriy Sanakoyev, escaped injury by a roadside mine. That night, both the Georgians and South Ossetians launched artillery attacks on each other’s villages and checkpoints, reportedly resulting in about a dozen killed or wounded. The European Union (EU), the OSCE, and the Council of Europe (COE) issued urgent calls for both sides to show restraint and to resume peace talks.

On July 8, 2008, four Russian military planes flew over South Ossetian airspace. The Russian Foreign Ministry claimed that the incursion had helped discourage Georgia from launching an imminent attack on South Ossetia. The Georgian government denounced the incursion as violating its territorial integrity.

on July 11 Georgia recalled its ambassador to Russia for “consultations.”

on July 21, 2008 the U.N. Security Council discussed the overflights at a closed meeting. Although no decision was reached, Georgian diplomats reportedly stated that the session was successful, while Russian envoy Vitaliy Churkin denounced the “pro-Georgian bias” of some Security Council members.¹⁰ The day after the Russian aerial incursion, then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice arrived in Georgia for two days of discussions on ways to defuse the rising tensions between Georgia and Russia. She stated that “some of the things the Russians did over the last couple of months added to tension in the region,” called for Russia to respect Georgia’s independence, and stressed the “strong commitment” of the United States to Georgia’s territorial integrity.¹¹

On July 25, 2008, a bomb blast in Tskhinvali, South Ossetia, killed one person.

⁷ Jim Nichol “Russia-Georgia Conflict in August 2008: Context and Implications for U.S. Interests” (Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, March 3, 2009), 6

⁸ JIM NICHOL, ARMENIA, AZERBAIJAN, AND GEORGIA: POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. INTERESTS (CRS Report for Congress, June 17, 2008) 8;

⁹ Iury Sulaberidze, The Nature of Political Split: The Rose Revolution, CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS, 2007, No. 1, 79.

¹⁰ Jim Nichol “Russia-Georgia Conflict”, 4

¹¹ U.S. Department of State. Press Release. Secretary’s Remarks: Remarks En Route Prague, Czech Republic, July 8, 2008.

On July 30, both sides again exchanged artillery fire, with the South Ossetians allegedly shelling a Georgian-built road on a hill outside Tskhinvali, and the Georgians allegedly shelling two Ossetian villages.

On August 1, five Georgian police were injured on this road by a bomb blast. This incident appeared to trigger serious fighting on August 2-4, which resulted in over two dozen killed and wounded. Kokoity threatened to attack Georgian cities and to call for paramilitary volunteers from the North Caucasus, and announced that women and children would be evacuated to North Ossetia. Georgia claimed that these paramilitary volunteers were already arriving in South Ossetia.

On the evening of August 7, 2008, South Ossetia accused Georgia of launching a “massive” artillery barrage against Tskhinvali, while Georgia reported intense bombing of some Georgian villages in the conflict zone. Saakashvili that evening announced a unilateral ceasefire and called for South Ossetia to follow suit. He also called for reopening peace talks and reiterated that Georgia would provide the region with maximum autonomy within Georgia as part of a peace settlement. Georgia claims that South Ossetian forces did not end their shelling of Georgian villages but intensified their actions, “forcing” Georgia to declare an end to its ceasefire and begin sending ground forces into South Ossetia (for more on this view of events, see below, “International Response”). Georgian troops reportedly soon controlled much of South Ossetia, including Tskhinvali.

On August 8, 2008 Russian President Medvedev addressed an emergency session of the Russian Security Council. He denounced Georgia’s incursion into South Ossetia, asserting that “women, children and the elderly are now dying in South Ossetia, and most of them are citizens of the Russian Federation.” He stated that “we shall not allow our compatriots to be killed with impunity. Those who are responsible for that will be duly punished.” He appeared to assert perpetual Russian control in stating that “historically Russia has been, and will continue to be, a guarantor of security for peoples of the Caucasus.”¹²

On August 10, Georgian National Security Council Secretary Alexander Lomaia reported that Georgia had requested that then-Secretary Rice act as a mediator with Russia in the crisis over the breakaway region of South Ossetia, including by transmitting a diplomatic note that Georgia’s armed forces had ceased fire and had withdrawn from nearly all of South Ossetia.¹³ Georgian Foreign Minister Eka Tkeshelashvili also phoned Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to report that all Georgian forces had been withdrawn from South Ossetia and to request a ceasefire, but Lavrov countered that Georgian forces remained in Tskhinvali.¹⁴

On August 11, Russia bombed apartment buildings in the city of Gori—within undisputed Georgian territory—and occupied the city. President Medvedev reiterated this principle that Russia is the permanent guarantor of Caucasian security and that “we have never been just passive observers in this region and never will be.”¹⁵ In response to the Georgian incursion into South Ossetia, Russia launched large-scale air attacks in the region and elsewhere in Georgia. Russia quickly dispatched seasoned professional (serving under contract) troops to South Ossetia that engaged Georgian forces in Tskhinvali on August 8. That same day, Russian warplanes destroyed Georgian airfields, including the Vaziana and Marneuli airbases near the Georgian capital Tbilisi. Saakashvili responded by ordering that reservists be mobilized and declaring a 15-day “state of war.” Reportedly, thousands of Russian troops had retaken Tskhinvali, occupied the bulk of South Ossetia, reached its border with the rest of Georgia, and were shelling areas across the border by

¹² Jim Nichol “Russia-Georgia Conflict”,5

¹³ “Agence France Presse” last modified March 14,2014 <http://www.afp.com/search/site/august%2010%2C2008/>

¹⁴ “Interfax” last modified March 14, 2014 <http://www.interfax.com/default.asp>

¹⁵ Jim Nichol “Russia-Georgia Conflict”4

early in the morning on August 10 (Sunday).¹⁶ These troops were allegedly augmented by thousands of volunteer militiamen from the North Caucasus.¹⁷

4. EU as a mediator in conflict resolution and peace building process

The EU Security Strategy of 2003 (EUSS), notes that ‘frozen conflicts, which also persist on our borders, threaten regional stability’.¹⁸ The EUSS states clearly that ‘violent conflict, weak states where organized crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe’,¹⁹ and goes on to demand very specifically that the Union ‘should now take a stronger and more active interest in the problems of the Southern Caucasus’.²⁰

The EU reacted to the crisis under the EU presidency of France. Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner flew to Tbilisi together with the OSCE chairman, Finland’s Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb, on late 9 August. On the way and the following morning they drafted a tentative ceasefire proposal on three key issues: cessation of hostilities, recognition of Georgia’s territorial integrity, as well as rapid re-establishment of the status quo ante. They discussed the plan with Foreign Minister Ekaterine Tkeshelashvili. Then they presented the proposal to President Mikhail Saakashvili who accepted it. After having visited the town of Gori on the request of the hosts, Kouchner and Stubb flew to Moscow in order to negotiate a ceasefire with the Russians. However, the French President Nicholas Sarkozy decided also to come to Moscow to negotiate the ceasefire personally. He brought with him a new peace plan that was based on the Kouchner-Stubb proposal but was prepared in Paris.²¹

On September 8, 2008, visiting French President Nicolas Sarkozy and Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev signed a follow-on ceasefire accord that fleshed out the provisions of the 6-point peace plan. Its main points were the following:

- No recourse to the use of force;
- A lasting cessation of hostilities;
- Unfettered access for humanitarian aid providers;
- Georgian forces must withdraw to their usual barracks;
- Russian forces must go back to positions they held prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Pending an international peace monitoring mechanism, Russian peacekeepers will take additional security measures;
- Launch of international discussions on security and stability arrangements for Abkhazia and South Ossetia²²

In a press conference after signing the accord, President Medvedev asserted that Russia’s recognition was “irrevocable,” and that Russian “peacekeepers” would remain deployed in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Although Sarkozy strongly implied that the international conference would examine the legal status of Georgia’s breakaway Abkhazia and South Ossetia,

¹⁶ Stéphane Lefebvre and Roger Mcdermott, “Intelligence Aspects of the Russia-Georgia Conflict,” *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, January 2009, 4–19.

¹⁷ Anne Barnard, Andrew Kramer, C.J. Chivers and Ellen Barry, “Clashes in Georgia Move Another Step Closer to All-Out War: Russian Bombers Strike Capital’s Airport,” *The New York Times*, August 11, 2008;

¹⁸ Council of the European Union, “A secure Europe in a better world: European Security Strategy” (Brussels, Dec 12. 2003), 5;

¹⁹ European Council, A secure Europe in a better world,7

²⁰ European Council, A secure Europe in a better world, 8

²¹ Tuomas Forsberg “THE EU AS A PEACE-MAKER IN THE RUSSO-GEORGIAN WAR ” Paper Presented at the Fifth Pan-European Conference on EU Politics, 23-26 June, 2010;

²²“Office of the State Minister of Georgia for Reconciliation and Civic Equality ” The six-point Peace Plan, last modified March 14, 2014 <http://www.smr.gov.ge/docs/doc111.pdf>

Medvedev pointed out that the regions had been recognized as independent by Russia on August 26, 2008, and stated that disputing this recognition was a “fantasy.” Sarkozy hailed the accord as possibly clearing the way for the EU to soon re-open partnership talks with Moscow.²³ The plan secured a cessation of hostilities but it was fraught with challenges – among others, its wording was vague and open to competing interpretations by sides and there were no time frames. Russia’s occupation of towns deep in Georgia, despite the plan’s provisions, and the continued lack of security in the “buffer zone”²⁴ around South Ossetia then controlled by the Russian Federation proper prompted Sarkozy’s second mediation effort. On 8th September, the sides signed a second ceasefire plan which set some specific benchmarks for the implementation of both agreements.²⁵

Russia troops withdrew from Poti and Senaki on September 13 in accordance with the follow-on accord. The European Union (EU) deployed 225 unarmed monitors to Georgia by October 1, 2008, to patrol areas along Georgia’s borders with its breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, in accordance with ceasefire accords. Russian troops pulled back by October 9 from so-called “buffer zones” they occupied outside of the borders of the regions. Troubling aspects included Russia’s apparent backing to efforts by Abkhazia and South Ossetia to increase the size of their territories at Georgia’s expense. In Abkhazia, Russian troops remained in the Kodori Gorge area and appeared to support Abkhaz efforts to move the border to the Inguri River. In South Ossetia, Russian checkpoints remained in Akhagori district, which was within the region’s Soviet-era borders but had been administered by Georgia since the South Ossetian conflict of the early 1990s. The United States continues to argue that the 6-point ceasefire plan calls for Russian troops in excess of pre-conflict numbers to withdraw from South Ossetia and Abkhazia.²⁶

If we look at what has to change in the Euro-Russian relationship European interest lies in coming to an agreement between Member States on a realistic, firm, intelligent policy:

1. **being realistic**, this means maintaining a consensus - even though this might be implicit - on the need to have a common, institutionalised policy with regard to Russia; this implies not believing that there has been a return to the Cold War or to the 1930's. The priority lies in giving as little ground as possible to the strategy of "divide and rule", which implies that the old Member States understand the perceptions and security interests of the new Member States and that the latter understand that it is in their own interest to have a structured relationship with Russia and not a single position but rather a synthesis of national positions and interests that are shared long term;
2. **being firm**, this means challenging the idea of limited or weak sovereignty which Moscow continues to want to force on the former Soviet republics, re-asserting the freedom of choice of States in their alliances, not accepting attacks made on international rules and the use of force. This may be achieved by the decisive enhancement of the neighbourhood policy in eastern Europe and why not for example by the establishment of advanced relations with the Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia or of an ad hoc formula of associate States;

²³ Jim Nichol “Russia-Georgia Conflict”10;

²⁴ Human Rights Watch Report, “Georgia: Satellite images show destruction, ethnic attacks”, August 29, 2009;

²⁵ International Crisis Group, “Georgia-Russia: Still insecure and dangerous”, Europe Briefing No. 53: 3. June 22, 2009, last modified March 14, 2014 <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/europe/B53%20Georgia-Russia%20-%20Still%20Insecure%20and%20Dangerous.pdf>

²⁶ Jim Nichol “Russia-Georgia Conflict”10;

3. **being intelligent**, to protect what has been achieved in the Euro-Russian relationship and to continue work in deploying European standards which will achieve change long term, discarding pretensions that consider Russia as a land to be converted. The European Union will form its strategy according to Russia's strategic orientations, either by helping it to integrate the world economy with an obligatory but normal partnership or by containing its old-fashioned, neo-imperialistic practices which are an attempt to restore its power by influencing areas on its borders, at the risk of isolating itself. The situation in the Caucasus must not be pushed to one side: UN initiatives, the re-initiation of discussions in the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan, encouraging Turkey to start dialogue with Armenia, preparing a regional conference directed towards the quest for regional integration. In Central Asia, in spite of the danger of losing western prestige, the European strategy, prepared under the German presidency, will have to be continued tenaciously.²⁷

Actually, the EU's criticism and the threat of stalled treaty negotiations did not sway Russia. It was in any case in Moscow's own interest to withdraw its forces from the self-declared buffer zone in Georgia and start a program of damage-limitation in international relations. But Moscow is also used to a squabbling and uncritical EU - and will thus have taken note of the Europeans' relatively strong reaction - relative, because compared with the tough rhetoric of some United States politicians the EU's reaction still looked feeble.

There are different opinions and debates about what kind of tools is available to resolve the Caucasus and other potential conflicts, including increasing the pressure on Russia if necessary. The EU was criticized for not using following tools against Russia:

- **First, economic sanctions** are a virtual non-starter, mainly because of a situation of mutual energy dependence: almost 30% of the gas consumed in the EU comes from Russia, making the EU Russia's biggest and most lucrative market (it is notable in this respect that Moscow has been careful not to mention energy in its angry exchanges with the west). In principle, the EU could try to limit Russian sales of non-energy goods or keep Russian investments out; but in the absence of a United Nations mandate, such steps would violate the EU's own rules for openness and non-discrimination. The EU cannot completely discard the option of using economic sanctions - in the event of Russian tanks trundling into another neighbor country, for example. But these would be a means of last resort. Meanwhile, talk of preventing Russia companies from operating in EU countries will only undermine the EU's credibility as a rules-based and open market.
- **Second, a veto of Russia's World Trade Organization (WTO)** application would contravene the EU's strong interest in persuading Russia to respect international trade rules and submit to the WTO's dispute-settlement procedures. Thus, it should not contemplate using the WTO to make a political point at a time when the organization is already gravely weakened through the breakdown of the Doha talks. Russia's accession is in any case not an immediate prospect - because of Moscow's increasingly erratic trade policy, the United States's refusal to repeal the Jackson-Vanik amendment (1974), and vetoes from Georgia and perhaps Ukraine (both now WTO members).

²⁷ Michel Foucher and Jean-Dominique Giuliani "THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE RUSSO-GEORGIAN WAR" European Issues n.108, September 1,2008,4-6;

- **Third, to ban Russians from visiting or working in EU countries** is a bad idea. If Russian citizens cannot travel, they may be more prone to believing their government's propaganda about a hostile and hypocritical west. But the EU needs to think carefully too about targeted visa sanctions, for a ban on Russian leaders and top officials would signal a new world in which the Europeans no longer believe that engagement can achieve anything.²⁸

However, A new narrative was needed to enhance the understanding of the process of imposing sanctions, but it also allows us to identify a number of issues that weaken the effectiveness of sanctions and which cannot be disregarded. Especially when sanctions become increasingly more targeted on individuals and specific products, legal challenges and implementation problems can seriously undermine the effectiveness of sanctions and, sometimes, also be counterproductive.

According to Francesco Giumelli, there should be three priorities for the immediate future: 1. pre-assessment phase - the Council needs to run thorough pre-assessment evaluations of the effects that sanctions are expected to have 2. monitoring - EU institutions need to be empowered when it comes to implementing and monitoring EU restrictive measures 3. policy coherence - sanctions cannot be disconnected from other foreign policy tools. In fact, sanctions should be devised and designed to complement other decisions linked to foreign assistance, use of force and diplomatic activity..²⁹

Two key issues, in our view, have prevented the EU, to date, from living up to its aspirations to become a globally significant and impactful conflict manager. The first of these is structural—the lack of a permanent External Action Service; the second is conceptual—the lack of a coherent and comprehensive conflict manage-meant strategy.³⁰

How the EU's sanctioning practices develop and evolve will determine what form of sanctions will be used in the next decade. According to this ongoing debate, there are two main scenarios for the future. The first one is that the importance of sanctions will be substantially reduced. The growing legal challenges raised by the Court combined with frustration linked to the lack of capacity to implement EU decisions firmly and coherently across the EU territory may discourage the use of targeted sanctions in the future in favour of other foreign policy instruments, such as the use of diplomacy or force.

Nevertheless, at the moment refraining from imposing sanctions does not seem like a viable option, which makes it more likely that the Council could return to adopting broader forms of sanctions, such as sectoral measures and embargoes. Even if softened by a number of exceptions and exemptions that would aim at reducing unnecessary human suffering, sanctions would hit sectors instead of companies and individuals in order to relieve EU institutions from the burden of proof. In other words, sanctions would be considered as a purely political instrument and the responsibility for their effects would be politically, and not legally, assumed by the Council.

This second scenario is more likely to shape the future of sanctions. Given their endurance in the international system and the limited alternatives to their imposition, the best mix could emerge as a combination of targeted sanctions with wider sanctions, assisted by slightly improved EU capacities

²⁸ “Center for European Reform” September 30, 2008, last modified March 14, 2014 <http://www.cer.org.uk/in-the-press/europe-and-georgia-russia-conflict>

²⁹ Francesco Giumelli “How EU sanctions work: a new narrative” institute for security studies European Union, CHAILLOT PAPERS N-129, May 2013, 40;

³⁰ RICHARD G. WHITMAN AND STEFAN WOLFF “The EU as a conflict manager? The case of Georgia and its implications” *Journal of International Affairs* 86: 1 (2010) 1–000, 17

to administer sanctions regimes, both in terms of policy planning (by adopting the three purpose approach that would offer benchmarks for gauging success) and in terms of monitoring the measures. Whatever negative perceptions still persist regarding the use of sanctions, it does not change their actual strategic importance and the fact that they will still be needed in the future. Considering the increasing level of legalization of the international system – covering a wide range of issues from countering international terrorism to money laundering – restrictive measures could be used less for policy-sensitive issues of crisis management and more for the fight against organized crime and cyber security. Targeted sanctions are in many ways akin to law-enforcement mechanisms and it would be appropriate to use them at the international level as well. The EU, as an emerging international security provider, should be ready to take on this challenge.³¹

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